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In a corpus of c. 250 hours of recorded interactions between young children and 
adults in USA and UK households, we found that children could be directed to 
change their course of action by three syntactic formats that offered alternatives: 
an imperative, or a modal declarative, plus a consequential alternative to non-
compliance (e.g. come down at once or I shall send you straight to bed; you've got 
to stand here with it or it goes back in the cupboard), or an interrogative requiring 
a preference (e.g. do you want to put them neatly in the corner for mummy please 
or do you wanna go to bed). Formatted syntactically as or-alternatives, these can 
perform the actions both of warning and threatening. But they make a 'bad' 
course of action contiguous to the child's turn. We argue that adults choose this 
format because the interactional preference for contiguity makes the negative 
alternative the more salient one. This implies that adults attribute to children the 








How do people get each other to do things? Work on requesting in interaction 
(Lindström, 2005; Heinemann, 2006;  Curl and Drew, 2008) has prompted an 
acceleration of interest in the varieties of ways of influencing others: from (to 
use rough glosses) hinting (Zinken, 2011), through advising (Shaw and Hepburn, 
2013), to proposing (Stevanovic 2012, Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2012), 
instructing (Antaki and Kent, 2012) and outright threatening (Hepburn and 
Potter, 2011; see also a quantitative survey of many these types in Takada 2013). 
As Stevanovic and Svennevig (this volume) say, this Special Issue adds to the 
body of research by reporting new work on the epistemic and deontic subtleties 
of the ways in which directives can be issued. In this article we explore how 
adults use an utterance the syntactic form of which offers children alternative 
courses of action to choose between; but which, on inspection of their 
deployment, can be seen to perform a less neutral action.  
 
To prefigure the data that we shall analyse, examples of the three types of 
directives that we found in our survey of various data sources are: you've got to 
stand here with it or it goes back in the cupboard; come down at once or I shall 
send you straight to bed; and do you want to put them neatly in the corner for 
mummy please or do you wanna go to bed. These directives use different syntactic 
formats, but the common thread among them is the action that the adult is 
performing: issuing an utterance that confronts the child with two exclusive 
courses of action. One of these courses is favoured; the other, not. The effect of 
the utterance is to issue a recommendation at best, or a threat at worst; but in 
any case, it is a directive, claiming some form of deontic authority, in the 
terminology suggested by Stevanovic (2012), and Stevanovic and Peräkylä 
(2012).  As we shall see, there is a puzzle about how the adults set out the 




Requests, directives and alternatives 
As helpfully outlined in the introduction to this Special Issue (Stevanovic & 
Svennevig, this volume), the impetus for an interactional (as opposed to a 
syntactic or pragmatic) study of directives can be said to have come from 
Heinemann's 2006 work on requests to home helpers, but perhaps more 
significantly from Curl and Drew's (2008) paper on telephone requests to 
doctors' clinics and to family members. Curl and Drew identified two factors with 
which one could mark one's request: the degree of entitlement one had in 
making it, and the degree to which one acknowledged the contingencies that the 
recipient might face in carrying it out. Thus, they reported, a call for medical help 
could assert the caller's right to receive attention at home, irrespective of the 
inconvenience to the doctor; or, conversely, could be put tentatively to indicate 
uncertain entitlement and an acknowledgement of the imposition made.  
 
Work on entitlement and contingency has subsequently been profitably 
extended, and since our interest is in adults' deontic authority over children, the 
direction that most concerns us is the work on imperatives during family 
mealtime conversations initiated by Craven & Potter (2010). Their focus on 
imperative formulations more starkly revealed participants’ orientations to the 
management of deontic asymmetries. For example, contextual factors such as 
who was at fault or how urgently an action needed to be performed could be 
drawn on by speakers to provide a warrant for more entitled formulations 
(Antaki & Kent, 2012). Recipients, as well as speakers, designed their talk to 
display their deontic stance towards the projected course of action. When 
responding to parental directives, the timing and nature of a child’s compliance 
could enable them to regain autonomy over their behaviour without openly 
defying the directive (Kent 2012). In other words, it was found that the struggle 
over deontic authority could play out in such a way as not only to identify what 
rights and entitlements are in play between the participants, but also what the 
possibilities and consequences of compliance or resistance might be. 
 
In delving further into the possibilities and consequences of directives by a more 
extensive empirical survey of the formats that adults used, we were struck by 
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how the syntactic format of "or" alternatives could work as an action to get the 
child to do something (or stop doing something). So far as we know, this use of 
alternatives - although it has a hinterland in the pragmatics literature (see, for a 
comprehensive account of conditional connectives, Declerck and Reed, 2001) - 
has not yet been remarked on in the interactional literature on directives.  As we 
shall see, its study throws up two intriguing issues in how adults manage their 
deontic authority: their flouting of the fundamental conversational norm of 
contiguity, and their ostensible privileging of the child's choice in complying with 
warnings and threats. 
 
Data: sources  
 
We searched for adults' use of alternatives in talking to children in two sets of 
sources: audio data deposited in the online resource Talkbanki, and video data 
held at Loughborough University, and at Keele University. 
 
a) Talkbank audio data 
From the CHILDES data in the Talkbank database (MacWhinney, 2007) we 
randomly selected six sources, representing about 240 hours of USA and UK 
recordings across a range of adult-child interactions, although the bulk of them 
are mother-child conversations. The age of the children in the recordings we 
sampled ranged from 1 year 9 months to 7 years 11 months. 
 
b) The Loughborough and Keele family-meal video datasets 
The Loughborough data are from three UK, native-English-speaking families 
with small children, representing about 12 hours of talk at mealtimes. The ages 
of children here were less precisely recorded than in the CHILDES dataset, but 
ranged between 3 years and 8 years old. The Talkbank and Loughborough 
datasets were used for our main survey, but later (as explained below) we also 
had recourse to a small corpus held at Keele University (the Beeston family-meal 
dataset, comprising 4 hours of mealtime conversations between 2 UK, native 
English-speaking families with children aged 3-11 years old). This latter small 
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collection was inspected for supplementary video evidence of children's visible 
compliance with the directives.  
 
Selection of cases 
We were after cases where we understood that the child was being directed to 
do something (that is, where at least one course of action was being proposed) in 
an utterance syntactically marked by the connective or.  That meant separating 
our set of cases from three neighbouring sets, using our native judgements as 
speakers (see Stivers, 2015, and Steensig and Heinemann, 2015, for a discussion 
of such quasi-coding procedures). One set was those or-marked offers that were 
not, in fact, directives - rather, they were apparently genuine enquiries about the 
child's preference between options about which the adult seemed to have no 
preference (e.g. do you want to do Row Row or do you want to do Humpty Dumpty 
in the context of a choice of playtime song) or where it would be unsafe (though 
possible) to presume such a preference (e.g. do you want to do the jigsaw or just 
play with the bits, in a context where there was nothing on the tape to indicate 
that the adult favoured one course of action over another). Another set were 
cases where, as Ariel (2013) observes, the or marked what were effectively 
yes/no questions inviting agreement to do a class of things (e.g. would you like to 
go out for a meal or to the cinema?, where this is understood as being an 
invitation to go out, and no requirement is made as to choosing the destination). 
We also discounted cases where or was in turn-final position (for a recent study 
of which, see Drake, 2013), since by definition the second item was unspecified. 
The selection of directives using or yielded 58 cases from about 252 hours of 
adult-child conversation in the TalkBank and Loughborough data. ii 
 
Data: basic types and their examples 
 
The adults' use of or in their directives were exclusively and exhaustively 
separable into three syntactic formats: imperatives, interrogatives and 
declaratives (42%, 21% and 13% respectively, of our sample of 58 cases). In 
each case this meant the child being presented with descriptions of two courses 
of action. If we look to see what actual content is being inserted into the syntactic 
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frame, we see that in all cases, the options were asymmetric: one was more 
favourably (or less unfavourably) described than the other. Thus there would be 
the alternatives, for example, of being silly on the one hand or eating properly on 
the other, and so on. This asymmetry is a strong hint as to what the utterances 
were doing. Let us see examples of each format before going on to that 
interactional analysis. 
 
Imperative plus consequential alternative of non-compliance 
Here the adult directs the child by giving them an ultimatum, in the form of a 
direct imperative followed by an aversive consequence that would ensue were it 
not followed. 
 
Example 1: Eng-UK/Thomas/3-00-14.cha line 1591 "be gentle"  
1     Mot:      >n' look< Thomas, (.2) Thomas (.) Thomas don't. 
2             be gentle with it, or you'll brea:k it.  
3                      (.3) 
 
Example 2:  Lboro Crouch 12  "Thank you Jesus" (note: Anna is a younger child 
who has been asked to say grace) 
01     Anna:   HEy, (.5) (I'm goiing to say) thanks to Jesus. 
02     Dad     ok, 
03                     (.8) 
04     Kath:   ok 
05                     (1.5) 
06     Kath:   I’m- (0.3) pu:tt[ing] some [chee:se on ] [ne::re!] 
07     Dad:                    [Wh-]      [>No no no.<] [Alwa-  ]  
08   Dad:    say >thank you Jesus.< (0.3) So just stop, whatever  
09           you’re doing, or Anna will get stressed.  
10                    (1.0) 
 
Declarative plus consequential alternative  
In these cases, the directive is issued by an utterance in which a course of action 
described with a modal verb (can, may, will, need etcetera) is paired, again, with 
an aversive consequence that would ensue if it were not chosen. 
 
Example 3: Eng-NA/Nelson/811220.cha line 178 "blanket" 
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01     Dad     you have a good na:p hon, 
02                 (.4) 
03     Chi     ((squeals/[cries)) 
04     Dad                [you want Da:d to put the 
05             blanket on you? 
06                 (.6) 
07     Chi     ( )  
08                 (.6) 
09     Chi     n::o::::::, ((whiny voice)) 
10                 (.3) 
11     Dad     well then ((name?)), it's time for a nap 
12             now. 
13     Mom:    ((off mike))(that's the only choice  
14             you have) [(  ) 
15   Dad:              [the only choice.=you can 
16           either ha:ve a na:p, 'n daddy's gonna 
17           put a blanket on you, 'r I'm 
18           jes' gonna walk out, 
  
Example 4: Braunwald/2-06-15.cha line 59 "salt" 
01     MOT:      .hhh >that's< PLEnny:::, (.2) thank you. 
02                      (.4) 
03     CHI:     ('nk you) 
04                      (.4) 
05   MOT:     that's enough, Laura=or you won't be able  
06            to eat [the egg 
07     CHI:            [mm.     
 
Interrogative with alternatives 
Here the directive is issued in interrogative format, where the child is offered a 
choice or asked to express a preference between two courses of action.  
 
Example 5: Eng-UK/Thomas/4-05-09.cha line 592 "go home" ("INV" is a visitor) 
01    INV:     .hh ARE YOU gonna talk to me prop'ly or  
02             am I gonna have to [go home. 
03      ?:                           [((cough)) 
 
Example 6: Eng-UK/ Lara.2-10-04.45 line 472 "neatly in the corner" iii 
01      MOT:     would you like to put them neatly in the corner 
02      CHI:     no 
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03      MOT:     well 
04      MOT:     would you put them neatly in the corner for  
05               mummy please 
06    MOT:     or do you wanna go to bed 
07      CHI: oh 
 
To summarise: these three syntactic forms of offering alternatives to the child 
entail a choice between two manifestly differently-valenced courses of action. 
Clearly these syntactic forms are freighted with interactional meaning: these 
aren't bloodless alternatives, nor even proposals or suggestions; they are 
something deontically stronger. 
 
"Or" in the service of warning and threatening. 
 
All of these syntactically-marked 'or' directives - imperative, modal or 
interrogative - are being issued with the extra force that identifying a 
consequence delivers. Bringing a foreseeable negative consequence onto the 
child's horizon is, as a speech-act analyst would immediately say, to issue 
something like a warning or perhaps even a threat. Indeed it seems to be 
grammatically as it were hard-wired into the format: as Declerck and Reed put it, 
when "the finite or-clause usually refers to post-present actualisation" - as 
indeed all of ours do - "it is always interpreted as a threat or warning, not as a 
promise" (2001, p 402). Here we can usefully take note of Hepburn and Potter's 
(2011) explicit speech-act inspired distinction, amply found in their adult-child 
data, between warnings - in which the consequence is not under the control of 
the speaker - and threats, where it is.  Their discussion was based on if/then 
formats, of which this is an example:  
 
Example 7: Crouch 06 6:40 (An example of a warning, from Hepburn and Potter 
2011) 
01     Mum:     [An]na? 
02                    (1.6) 
03     Anna:    Uhhuhh ((more of a sob than a response)) 
04                    (0.6) 
05   Mum:     If you don' eat your dinner:, (0.4) 
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06            there'll be no pudding. 
 
Example 8 - an example of a threat, from Hepburn and Potter (2001) (part of 
their example 1, with lines renumbered, and transcription slightly simplified)).  
 
01   Mum   'if you carry on whingeing and whining,= 
02          during breakfas'time I'll send you 
03          to the bottom step. 
 
Note that Mum who has control over the consequences, so this comes off as a 
threat (in British English, a common current penalty trope is to be made to sit for 
a given period on the bottom step, or the 'naughty' step, of the staircase in the 
home). 
 
Whereas Hepburn and Potter limited their analysis to 'if/then' formulations, it is 
easy to see that the 'or' format also allows the adult the freedom to state a 
consequence which can be either under the their control or not. We have already 
seen three examples of 'or' directives rendered as warnings (... or you'll break it; 
... or Anna will get stressed; ... or you won't be able to eat the egg, in Extracts 1, 2 
and 4 respectively), which show how the second alternative can be construed as 
something negative but not under the adult's control. Here is another:  
 
Example 9 An 'or' directive as a warning. 
Eng-NA/Braunwald/2-03-XXb.cha 122 "drop the bird" (the topic seems to relate 
to a previous event when the father caught a bird; it's possible that the mother is 
echoing what she said to the child at the time). 
 
01     MOT:    we stamped our feet, Laura. 
02                 (.4) 
03     MOT:    making loud noises. 
04                 (.8) 
05   MOT:    careful or [he'll drop the bird. 
06     CHI:                [let me. 
07                 (.8) 
08     CHI:    (  ) m-me too 
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When the second alternative is under the speaker's control, then the 'or' works 
as a threat. Example 3 (.... or I'm jes gonna walk out) was one such; here is 
another. 
 
Example 10: An 'or' directive as a threat. 
Eng-UK/Thomas/3-01-14.cha 270 "eat those biscuits" 
01     MOT:    and what else did you have at the party today. 
02                 (.8) 
03     CHI:    what party, 
04                 (.4) 
05     MOT:    at (Elenas)'s house (>surely you remember<) 
06                 (.8) 
07     CHI:    (                       ) 
08                 (.4)      
09     MOT:    you're sitting [there  
10     CHI:                    [talking. 
11                 (.4)    
12   MOT:    sitting there ta:lking. > hurry up and eat  
13           those biscuits=>(or I'm jus')  going to take them  
14             away< 
15                 (2.0) 
16     MOT:    you had some pitta bread, 
 
 
What we notice about these threats and warnings with the or format is that, like 
if/thens, they allow, or seem to allow, the child a free choice as to what to do 
(stacked though the options might appear); and both formats allow the speaker 
to predict either an (apparently) agentless consequence- there'll be no pudding, 
or a consequence explicitly under the speaker's control  - I'm jus' going to take 
them away. We can go furtherv, and cast the action in epistemic and deontic 
terms: warnings imply a difference in epistemic authority (the adult knows more 
than the child what the consequences are), while threats imply a deontic 
authority (the adult is entitled to control what that consequence is going to be). 
Threats and warnings in both the or and the if/then formats share this feature. 
 
But there is an important difference between the formats. Notice that all the 
examples we've see so far show the adult putting the negative consequence at 
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the end of their turn, be it warning or threat (... or he'll drop the bird, ... or I'm jes 
gonna walk out, and so on). The if/then and or formats differ radically in how 
strongly they constrain such placement. So for a speaker to choose one format 
over another is revealing.  
 
Putting the worse alternative last 
The adult doesn't have to use a directive format that puts the worse alternative 
last. The range of conditionals (covered comprehensively in DeClerck and Reed 
(2001), includes such connectives as unless, until, lest, whether, in case and so on, 
which vary in such permissiveness. This isn't the place to survey those 
conditional connectives exhaustively, but if we keep to if/then (for which we 
have empirical data from Hepburn and Potter, 2011) and or, we see a real 
difference between the two.  
 
If/then is wholly permissive: you could put the negative consequence first, as in 
if you're not gentle with it you'll break it or second, as in you'll break it if you're 
not gentle with it. With or, on the other hand, two of the three formats that we 
have seen people use - imperatives and modal declaratives - are wholly 
restrictive. Consider the imperative just stop whatever you're doing, or Anna will 
get stressed; and the declarative you can either have a nap, 'n daddy's gonna put a 
blanket on you, 'r I'm jes gonna walk out. These cannot be reordered with the 
connective or. If you wanted to put the clause Anna will get stressed first, you 
would have to choose another connective - for example, unless (thus Anna will 
get stressed unless you just stop whatever you're doing).  Or indeed if/then, thus: 
Anna will get stressed if you don't just stop whatever you're doing.  
 
So to choose the or format, at least in its imperative or declarative form, is to 
choose a format which must present the child with the worse alternative last.  
While this is not true of the interrogative format - the adult could just as easily 
ask do you wanna to go to bed or do you want to put them neatly in the corner for 
mummy please as they can do you want to put them neatly in the corner for 
mummy please or do you wanna go to bed - if we look empirically in our 
collection, we find that it turns out that the latter order, with the negative 
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alternative last, is empirically twice as likely (14 cases to six; and all these six 
exceptions came from one parent-child dyadvi). 
 
So all in all, although speakers are not obliged to do so, the adults in our survey 
used a format which either obliged them to put the worse alternative second (in 
the 38 cases of imperative or declarative formats), or usually to put it second 
anyway, even if there was a choice (in 14 of the 20 cases of interrogatives). Why 
is this notable? 
 
Flouting contiguity 
It is notable because, as Sacks had established as one of the first principles to 
emerge from Conversation Analysis, the normative expectation is that one's 
addressee orient to the last thing one says (i.e., the most contiguous to her or his 
turn at turn at talk). Sacks (1987: 60) puts it this way: “it is a rather general rule 
that where two questions are produced, and you are going to have two answers, 
then the order of the answers is the reverse order of the questions”.  Evidence is 
legion; we may take as an exemplar Heritage and Roth (1995) who confirmed 
the pattern in news interviews, in which recipients “respond first to the final TCU 
of the prior turn, thereby treating it as the sequentially implicative component of 
the turn” (1995: 18), and the principle has passed into general acceptance as a 
background force in interaction.  
 
For specific evidence in favour of the strength of the contiguity principle after 
'or', we may turn to the work done by Koshik (2005), on alternatives as vehicles 
for repair-initiation. Here the desirability and undesirability of the two 
alternatives necessarily comes into play. They are embedded in a question 
format, in an environment signalling that there is something that needs repair in 
the previous speaker's turn. Koshik identifies two such usages - to indicate that 
the previous speaker has said something that requires mechanical checking, or, 
going step further, to use the question actually to suggest a correction. Here are 
examples of each variety: 
 




01     Ken:    Bu-that convertible we went to Huntington Beach 
02             an’ he jumped. He jumped outta the convertible 
03             goin sixty miles an hour. 
04             [Big fat slob-  
05    Roger:  [Sixteen or sixty.  
06     Ken:    We-I-di-wu-we were on the f- on that Huntington 
07             Coast Road?  
 




01     Libby:     hhh and in fact (0.2) the ones who 
02.               had no specialization (0.8) .h understood (.) 
03                the revi:sed manual better and could  
04                explain it.= 
05 → Tamar:      =revised ‘r abridged. 
06    Libby:      u- well it was re[vised, it] wasn’t  
07    Tamar?:                       [         ] 
08    Libby:      abridged.=cause [they didn’t shorten it.  
 
For our purposes, notice that in both the checking and the correcting case, it is 
the 'correct', desirable, alternative option that is listed second. Koshik gives an 
interactional account thus: "[b]y offering an alternative to a term used by the 
recipient, one that cannot be understood as an alternate hearing, it suggests that 
the original term be reconsidered in favour of the alternative." (ibid, p 204). 
Tamar is offering, in line 5, a corrective repair initiator - she thinks that Libby 
meant that the book was abridged (not revised).  (As it happens, Libby resists 
this and reasserts that it was indeed revised.) Libby's answer is less important to 
note than the preference expressed in Tamar's question: that the second 
alternative be the correct one. 
 
Comparing these repair-initiations to our directives, then, the question that 
arises is this: if Koshik's analysis of repair-questions putting the desirable option 
second extends to directives, then the adult ought to put the desirable, positive 
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directed course of action (as they would a repair) in second, contiguous position. 
That would put, as it does with repair, conversational pressure for the recipient 
to confirm the positive option. But, as we have seen, this is the exact reverse of 
what happens in our adult-child directives.  The second, contiguous, ready-to-be-
responded to option is the worse one. 
 
Somehow, then, the adult is achieving their goal of directing the child towards 
complying with the first option (not using too much salt and so on) by, in fact, 
inviting them conversationally to address the second, more contiguous, option 
(not being able to eat the egg and so on).  
 
Uptake 
Do the children 'get it', and see that the adult is not, in fact, inviting them to take 
up the second alternative? It is not always possible to tell from the (audio) 
transcripts in the Talkbank data, because the child's compliance (that is, their 
orientation to the first rather than the second alternative) may go unremarked as 
such. In no case did we ever see the adult explicitly praise the child for carrying 
out the directive. There were plenty of cases, though, where business moves on, 
implying that the adult was satisfied. For example: 
 
Example 13: Braunwald/2-06-15.cha line 59 "salt" (Expansion of example 4 
above) 
01     MOT:      .hhh >that's< PLEnny:::, (.2) thank you. 
02                      (.4) 
03     CHI:     ('nk you) 
04                      (.4) 
05   MOT:     that's enough, Laura=or you won't be able  
06            to eat [the egg 
07     CHI:            [mm.     
08                    (2.0) 
09     CHI2:    daddy where's your salt. 
10                    (2.5) 
11     Dad:     I just put a little on, (.5) a little bit. 
12     Chi:     .hh AN' I WANT MY (egg    [  ) 
13     Chi2?                               [(   ) 
14     MOT:                                [here it is, sweetie. 
15     Chi2:    (       ) daddy? 
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16     Dad:     yuh, 
17                  (.8) 
18     Dad:     [(jus' a little bit of salt) 
19     Mom:     [(it) doesn't need a lot of salt. 
20                  (4.0) 
21     Mom:     so, what was the best thing about vacation. 
 
The mother's injunction to stop salting the egg seems to be successful; although 
no-one comments on it as such, the absence of further directives and the 
apparently harmonious talk seems to indicate that  matters were resolved 
satisfactorily. This matches the typical sequential pattern for parental directives 
described by Kent (2011) in which explicit orientations to completed compliance 
were almost entirely absent from the data. Instead, the most recurrent practice 
was for an unmarked transition to other topics of conversation following 
compliance. 
 
For video evidence we may also call up some reinforcements from some further 
work we undertook with a new small sample (we are grateful to Michelle 
Beeston for collecting and transcribing these data): 
 
Example 14 (Beeston: Morris_01) "switch it off" 
1          ((Jim turns away from the table and watches T.V  
2          while chewing)) 
3                (4.5)  
4          ((Mum notices that Jim is no longer facing the  
5          table)) 
6    Mum:  Jim. 
7                (.) ((Jim looks at mum)) 
8  → Mum:  Turn round and eat your dinner or I’m going to  
9          switch it off. 
10        ((Jim immediately turns back to face the table  
11         and continues to eat)) 
 
Example 15 (Beeston: Morris_02) spits drink 
1           ((Jimmy spits drink onto the table)) 
2           [(0.7)                      ] 
3           [((Mum looks at Jimmy and raises her eyebrows))] 
4 → Mum:    Don’t Jimmy or you’ll just go to bed. 
5           ((Jimmy takes another drink and swallows it)) 
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In both of these cases the evidence is that the imperatives work immediately 
(although we don't know if they would have done so had they been issued on 
their own, without the or-refaced consequence (... or I'm going to switch it off; ... 
or you'll just go to bed) being spelled out). 
 
Even the audio records provide corollary evidence in the form of occasions on 
which the child seems to resist the directive, and things do not run smoothly. 
Compare that with what happens here, where the issue if the child putting on a 
blanket: 
 
Example 16: Eng-NA/Nelson/811220.cha line 178 "blanket" (expansion of 
Example 3 above). 
01     Dad     you have a good na:p hon, 
02                 (.4) 
03     Chi     ((squeals/[cries)) 
04     Dad                [you want Da:d to put the 
05             blanket on you? 
06                 (.6) 
07     Chi     ( )  
08                 (.6) 
09     Chi     n::o::::::, ((whiny voice)) 
10                 (.3) 
11     Dad     well then ((name?)), it's time for a nap 
12             now. 
13     Mom:    ((off mike))(that's the only choice  
14             you have) [(  ) 
15   Dad:              [the only choice.=you can 
16           either ha:ve a na:p, 'n daddy's gonna 
17           put a blanket on you, 'r I'm 
18           jes' gonna walk out, 
19     Chi:?   ((sniff)) 
20     Dad:    with no blanket. 
21                 (.7) 
22     Chi:?   ((sniff)) 
23                 (1.3) 
24     Dad:    [that's y'r choice. 
25     Chi:    [(   ) 
26                 (.5) 
27   Dad:    [blanket, or no blanket 
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28     Chi:    [(   ) 
29                 (.3) 
30     Chi:    [(no:: hh / no: (bluh)) 
31     Dad:    okay. 
32     Chi:    >hh< I LIE: [(.5) [(dow) 
33     Dad:                 [w'll [okay (    )  
 
Unlike the salting-egg case, here there is turbulence after the directive. The adult 
is manifestly unsatisfied, and in a series of increments repeats the directive, in 
stripped-down form (blanket or no blanket, line 27). The episode seems to end in 
a compromise where the child lies down, but without the blanket; but it all runs 
off far less smoothly than when the or-formatted directive is understood and 
complied with immediately. Taken all together, the evidence seems to be that 
adults are justified in attributing to children - even quite young children - the 






We set out to examine how adults directed children by offering them 
alternatives. Put so baldly, 'offering alternatives' - with what one might imagine 
to be, syntactically, its default position of equality between the options - sounds 
egalitarian and respectful of the child's preferences, sensitively avoiding outright 
direction. But inspection showed that this was manifestly not so.  These were all 
directives of a rather forceful kind.  
 
This is to be set against Stevanovic and Peräkylä's (2012) observation that  
deontic authority over another person is something to be handled delicately. 
That was strongly implied in Curl and Drew's (2008) analysis of data from calls 
requesting house calls from out-of-hours doctors' clinics, where the caller had to 
negotiate the gap between their needs and the authority of the doctor, who had 
the decisive vote. Hence the caller's display of entitlement and awareness of 
contingency in the making of requests. Even when the request comes from the 
senior partner in an interaction, such sensitivities can still be of concern:  in 
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Stevanovic and Peräkylä's (2012) study of colleagues in a work setting, the 
senior member, although institutionally higher in the official hierarchy, 
nevertheless did not simply issue bald instructions to the junior. As with calls to 
the doctor, there was a clear display of some degree of orientation to the other's 
agency, or choice in the matter (see a fuller discussion of responsibility for action 
in Couper-Kuhlen and Etelämäki's article, this volume).  
 
The sensitivity to too-naked deontic authority in the exchange of requests (in 
Curl and Drew) and suggestions (in Stevanovic and Peräkylä) is an index of a 
relationship that is close enough in authority - between adults at work, or even 
in service encounters - to make the exercise of power negotiable. With parents 
and their children, the matter seems very different. Previous work on parents' 
directives (Craven & Potter, 2010; Antaki & Kent, 2012; Kent 2012) strongly 
suggested that negotiations were much more one-sided. And the research that 
we report in this article reveals that or-formatted directives are a vehicle for a 
particularly loaded way of issuing warnings and threats - while appearing to be 
sensitive to the child's freedom of choice.  
 
In an or-formatted directive, the child is of course faced with a choice, and is 
being - ostensibly - left to make the decision between them on the basis of their 
own judgement and preferences (most explicitly in interrogative ors, where the 
appeal to the child's preferences can be actually built into the alternatives, as in, 
for example, do you want to put them neatly in the corner for mummy please or do 
you wanna go to bed.  
 
But with or, the alternatives are set out such that the negative one is placed last 
(by definition in the case of imperatives and declaratives, and, in our sample, by 
the adults' general preference in the case of interrogatives). It is this that 
differentiates or from if/then and other conditional connectives.  A directive with 
or necessarily makes the negative alternative highly salient, making the child 
orient to something expressly bad. The child has (as it were consciously) to 
ignore the highly salient, contiguous, negative alternative being dangled in front 
of them, and choose the earlier non-contiguous option. Adults assume that the 
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children will understand this flouting of the contiguity principle, and the children 
seem to do so.  
 
Although it might be unlikely to see this loaded use of alternatives in more 
symmetric relationships, where deontic authority is not quite so unevenly 
distributed, and no threat or warning seems to be at issue, we have found a 
telling case of contiguity being flouted in an interrogative in a very different, 
adult, environment. Heritage & Roth (1995), in their analysis of news interviews, 
include this example (see example 17, below). 
 
Example 17: (DLP 4: Lansman:1-2 from Heritage & Roth, 1995, p19) 
1   IR:   If you do lose, are you going to quit. 
2         (.) 
3   IR:   Is that um- <(uh) what I want to know is,> 
4         are you <going t’go> on:: with this campaign, 
5         or is that the- th’ zenith of the- (0.2) of 
6         th’ le:ft. 
7   IE:   º.hº U::h, (.) <what. is-> hhhh I mean I- (.) 
8         I sincerely hope <it isn’t> th’ zenith <o’th’ 
9         left an:- certainly we w’l go on: campaigning, 
10        .hh because, I mean:, 
          
First notice the ordering of the two options in the interviewer’s question: 1) are 
you going to go on with this campaign or 2) is that the zenith of the left? (lines 4-
6). Clearly 'going to go on with a campaign' is what would be (from the 
interviewee's point of view) the desirable choice (showing determination and 
resilience and so on), while to accede to the second alternative would be to give 
up, and accept that their party is on the way down. So the second alternative is a 
worse one.  This is the answer that is contiguous to the interviewee's turn - but 
s/he rejects it. S/he deals with the two alternatives in reverse order: 1) I 
sincerely hope it isn’t the zenith of the left and 2) certainly we will go on 
campaigning (lines 8-10). Like the children ignoring the offer of doing or 
suffering something undesirable, and complying instead with the non-contiguous 
part of the adult's utterance, the news interviewee recognises the trap and steps 
away from it neatly. 
 
 21 
It is that sense of a rhetorical trap that the children are alive to when confronted 
by the parent's or-formatted directive - especially when we notice that all the 
directives we found mark a fault of some kind. Just as in our examination 
elsewhere of imperatives issued to children and to adults with intellectual 
impairment (Antaki and Kent, 2012), the or-directives here would be reactive to 
something that the issuer considered unacceptable or inopportune: not eating or 
not eating properly, being too rough, not talking clearly, taking too much of 
something, and such catch-alls as 'being silly'.  So the environment favours an 
urgent directive, set up in such a way that the child ends up heeding the warning 
(or threat) and choosing the course of action that the adult favoursvii.  
 
Warnings and threats can be thought of as privileging two different kinds of 
authority that the speaker has over their recipient: warnings imply greater 
epistemic authority (the speaker claims more awareness the consequences of the 
action) while threats imply greater deontic authority (the speaker advertises 
their greater, perhaps sole, control over the consequences of the action). It is 
possible to identify cases where it is arguable that the adult is issuing the 
directive somewhat ambivalently, disguising a threat (with its greater deontic 
load) as a mere warning (where the asymmetry is only epistemic). Here is an 
example: 
 
Example 18 Eng-UK/Thomas/3-07-03.cha 274 "have to move" 
01     Chi :    and now we can play outside (uk-)=couldn't we,  
02              far:ty (.) pants. 
03                  (.4) 
04     Mot:     >er=excuse< me don't call me farty [pants.   
05     Chi:                                          [ehheh. 
06                  (.6) 
07     Chi:     ((coughs)) 
08                  (.4) 
09     Chi:     .hh (it is-) 
10     Mot:     so you sit there [now=an' be careful 
11     Chi:                       [fa:rty pants, 
12                  (.4) 
13     Mot:     in fact the sun's so bright, I'm having  
14              a job to see [outside 
15                            [((thudding sound)) 
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16   Mot:     no:, (.3) Thomas, no kicking or you'll  
17            have to move,  
18                  (.3) 
19     Mot:     .hhh (.3) look, can you see all those plants  
20              that we planted in the tub in the summer,  
 
An environment of fault is established by the child's addressing his mother with 
the naughty term "farty pants" at line 2. The mother admonishes him with two 
direct imperatives at line 4 and 10; nevertheless the child repeats the term, in 
overlap with the mother's second imperative. She seems to let this go in favour 
of changing the subject, but the child overlaps the end of her turn with some 
kicking. It is at this point that the mother issues the or-formatted declarative no 
kicking or you'll have to move (lines 16-17). The consequential clause you'll have 
to move is ambiguous as to the need for movement; it is given as an impersonal 
contingency, but it is not hard to read it as a threat over which the mother has 
control. Such disguise is at its most transparent in such warnings as ... or it goes 
back in the cupboard and  ... or you'll be in trouble (extracted from cases in our 
sample, but not presented in full here).  The surface of the directive is seemingly 
an exercise in epistemics (the mother merely predicting what will happen), but 
its force is effectively a deontic one. 
 
There is a comparison that is worth making, and that is with the familiar practice 
(especially in routine medical settings, as documented by Heritage and Stivers, 
1999) of asking 'no-problem' or  'optimistic' questions. Where these involve 
alternatives, the contiguous alternative would be a no-problem one, inviting the 
patient to confirm that all was well. This of course is just the opposite of the 
directives we report here, but there is a variant of the no-problem case that is 
instructive. Antaki and O'Reilly's (2014) study of mental health practitioners' 
questions to children in psychiatric history-taking revealed a large proportion of 
what seemed at first sight to be these no-problem questions, where the latter 
alternative was (comparatively, in psychiatric terms) mild. For example, you 
want to kill yourself .. ((child nods)) ... is it really wanting to die, or is it anger. 
Interactionally, this favours the second, more tractable alternative (an agentless 
"anger") - but this has the advantage of making the child's choice of the serious 
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alternative (really wanting to die) a deliberate resistance to the 'easier', more 
contiguous, answer, and so more diagnostically valuable. The theme this shares 
with our directives is that it privileges - for very different reasons - the child's 
own choice in the alternatives being presented to them. 
 
We might conclude with a speculation about children's understanding of a 
conversational normative rule being flouted. If our interpretation is right, then at 
least in the interrogative format of or, we seem to be seeing unusually young 
children appreciating irony in conversationviii. In the psychological literature, a 
child's understanding of others' private intentions and beliefs, as displayed in the 
Theory of Mind false belief task (Lang and Perner, 2002) puts it at about 4 years - 
whereas some of the children in our data sample were well below that age (Lara, 
for example, whose mother contributed 21 of the directives, was aged between 1 
year and 9 months to 3 years and 3 months).  There is an echo here of the 
interactional competences of children revealed in the close analyses by Wootton 
(for example Wootton, 2010) and Forrester (for example, Forrester 2008) who - 
unlike the case of most researchers in Theory of Mind work - study children's 
talk in situ rather than in experimental settings. 
 
In sum, then, the data we report here identifies three formats for using 
alternatives as a vehicle for directives which warn and threaten. The 
interactional effect is that they seemingly preserve the child's choice and agency, 
while tipping the balance heavily in favour of the adult's preference. To come off 
successfully, they rely on the child being able to decode a flouting of the 
normative conventions of contiguity in conversation, adding a further piece of 
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i  Available online at < http://talkbank.org/>. 
 
ii  In other words, use of "or" alternatives in talk was not very frequent, as Stivers 
(2010) found in a survey of American English conversation. 
 
iii  Data from the "Lara" source are not available in audio, and the transcription 
here is preserved from the Talkbank original. 
 
iv Repeated listening suggests that what the mother says might be "otherwise" 
rather than "or" (thus otherwise I'm jus' going to take them away). "Otherwise" is 
a much more infrequent conditional connective - there is no other example in 
our sample. 
 
v We are grateful to the Editors for this insight. 
 
vi There were 6 exceptions to the principle that the negative option be presented 
second. They came from just one speaker, and formed about half of the directives 
that she issued in the interrogative format (not in imperatives or declaratives).  
(We may add that these ors here are still in the service of directives - they are not 
the disinterested enquiry into the child's preferences.) 
Here is an example: 
 
Lara.2-08-23.180 silly sensible 1 
01 MOT: if you're gonna be silly I'm gonna put the book away 
02 MOT: right 
03 MOT: shall I put it away then 
04 MOT: shall I 
05 MOT: are you gonna be silly or sensible 
06 MOT: come on then 
07 MOT: look 
08 MOT: he's on a big mat . 
 
The five others can be listed in summary form: are you going to be silly or are you 
going to be sensible (in different episode form the one shown above); are you 
going to harass your sister all day or are you going to be a good girl; are you going 
to be silly or not; and do we say I want my dolly or do we say please may I have my 
dolly , mummy. This speaker also uses the pattern established in the majority of 
cases (i.e. negative alternative second); so it may be simply that this adult 
speaker on occasion reverts to the default principle of making the contiguous 
part of the turn the 'desirable' one.  One possibility fo the mother's switch 
between formats is that the girl might be at an age (two years and eight months) 
where it's not always clear that she is able to cope with the irony of putting the 
negative element last.  
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vii On this point, it is worth noting that in the Talkbank data, directives were very 
rare in recordings where the adult was joining the child in pretend play. One 
explanation may be that in pretend play the child may genuinely be allowed to 
have the epistemic and deontic upper hand about what is going on, compared to 
the business of finishing one's dinner. 
 
viii As one of the reviewers pointed out, this would not be true of or when in the 
imperative format, as in "gently or you'll break it", which does not require any 
appreciation of irony. 
